Community Connections, Spring 2002
A
Verdict So Foul
By
Joseph Glazer
In
Houston, Texas,Andrea Yates, whose story we know mostly through fourth
hand information, was convicted of murdering her children and sentenced
to life in prison. We don't know the whole story, but we do know that
during the course of her trial, both the prosecution and the defense agreed
that Mrs. Yates has a psychosis-based mental disorder.
Even casual observers were shocked that it took the jury only four hours
to deliberate their way to guilt. But here is the conundrum; in pursuing
the plea of not guilty by reason of mental defect, Andrea Yates had to
begin her defense by admitting her guilt. The jury actually determined
that she was not impaired by mental illness at the time she killed her
kids.
Criminal culpability requires two elements - does the evidence prove that
the accused committed the crime, and did that person have the knowing
intent (which requires mental capacity to know right from wrong) when
doing the crime. The vast majority of cases hinge on sufficient evidence,
and the U.S. constitution says people cannot be forced to give evidence
against themselves. A person who wishes to exert a defense against the
other element is governed by the "McNaughton Rule", which stems
from a mid-19th century court decision. To avoid conviction for lack of
mental capacity, the accused must, contrary to the provisions of the constitution,
admit committing the crime, and again contrary to the constitution, be
guilty until they can prove their incapacity - in essence, proving a negative.
It sounds complicated, and it gets worse. In all trials, the judicial
system precludes a jury from hearing anything about what sentence or other
disposition an accused may face. We have two-part trials to avoid having
juries pick verdicts based on how much time they want the accused to serve.
The determination of guilt, or not guilty, is meant to be pure in nature,
absent any outside influence or prejudice.
Yet, in Andrea Yates' case, the jury knew the charges were "Capital
Murder". They knew she had admitted to killing 5 children. What they
were not allowed to know was if they found her not guilty by reason of
mental defect, she would be remanded to the custody of the state psychiatric
system, spending many years, if not the rest of her life, in a psychiatric
hospital. They could believe, if they so chose, that a not guilty verdict
for her would be like any other --- she would walk out of the court, free
to go home, untreated, to have and kill more children. And no one in the
justice system could tell them otherwise.
As this process played out, mental health experts, providing very technical
testimony, competed with a chilling backdrop of death, murder, and super-sized
photographs of dead babies and toddlers lying neatly in a row. Mental
health aspects became secondary to the theatre of the macabre, and each
time an expert offered their opinion on whether or not she knew right
from wrong that morning, they did so in front of pictures of beautiful
children, happy and playing in some, lying dead in bed or the bathtub
in others.
In this light the jury's verdict is not so surprising. What is surprising
is that our system allows it.
In the words of former Chief Judge of the State of New York, Sol Wachtler,
"The McNaughton rule works in minor cases, like misdemeanors. For
the most heinous of crimes, its effects are the exact opposite of its
intent."
One hundred and forty years later, the state of the law is an abomination.
It must be changed.
That change will not come easily, as evolution of the system runs into
many obstacles. If we allow the jury to hear only the confession, and
preclude them from hearing and seeing the highly prejudicial evidence
necessary to convict (why convict again a person who's pled guilty?),
will it inflate the number of accused who try to assert the defense?
Do we allow the judge to tell the jury that if they find the accused not
guilty by reason of mental defect, that it is not freedom that awaits
them, but rather remand to the custody of the state psychiatric system?
If the constitution can be bent, twice, away from the accused, can't it
be bent once back?
Do we change the plea, as some law makers have proposed, to "Guilty
but Insane", where a person is convicted of the crime, and goes to
a mental health prison facility until they are healthy enough to face
the correctional system? Or is this an equally flawed permutation of the
already horrendous?
There are no easy answers. But we must begin to seek them, as a just and
humane society cannot tolerate many verdicts so foul.
posted
4/9/02
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